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Abstract  
Guided by the theory of constructed emotion, we developed a preliminary measure of 
interoceptive body signal beliefs and examined how such beliefs relate to trait interoceptive 
ability, sympathetic nervous system reactivity and affective stress during a stress induction task. 
During the first session of the study, we used a heartbeat detection task as a measure of 
interoceptive ability and collected self-reported data on participants’ bodily signal beliefs. In a 
follow-up session, we collected continuous measures of sympathetic response as participants 
completed the Trier Social Stress Test. Through hierarchical regression analyses, we found that 
sympathetic reactivity predicted both negative affect and somatic intensity during the stress 
induction task. Additionally, the interaction between negative beliefs about one’s bodily signals 
and interoceptive ability significantly predicted somatic intensity during stress. Moreover, we 
found a significant interaction between sympathetic reactivity and positive body signal beliefs in 
predicting negative affect, suggesting that positive body signal beliefs may buffer the relation 
between sympathetic reactivity and negative affect. These findings collectively suggest that the 
beliefs individuals have about the meaning of their bodily signals, in addition to sympathetic 
reactivity and interoceptive ability, can play a key role in amplifying affective stress.  
 
 
 
  
BODY SIGNAL BELIEFS 
 
  
4 
We easily notice the sting or a paper cut or the throbbing of a stubbed toe, but how do we 
interpret sensations arising from within the body? Interoception refers to the sense of the internal 
and physiological condition of the body, centrally generated and represented in the brain using 
peripheral feedback from visceral organs (Craig, 2003). Prior work reveals surprising variability 
in the extent to which individuals notice internal sensations. For example, some people find it 
difficult to notice or identify interoceptive sensations (e.g. as is the case in patients with major 
depressive disorder, who generally display lower accuracy on heartbeat counting tasks relative to  
healthy controls; Khalsa & Lapidus, 2016; Pollatos, Traunt-Mauch, & Schandry, 2009) while 
others appear hypervigilant to internal sensations (e.g. for example, patients with somatic 
symptom disorders tend to disproportionally report noxious internal sensations; Barsky 1992;   
Khalsa & Lapidus, 2016). Despite evident variation in people’s ability to notice their internal 
sensations, or interoceptive ability, relatively little is known about how healthy individuals 
evaluate and codify the bodily signals we experience on a daily basis, such as in emotions. 
Furthermore, only a small body of work within affective science investigates how individual 
variation in the ability to notice these bodily signals may shape instances of emotion.  
 Drew Leder (1990) writes that our “interoceptive language,” or the words we use to 
describe sensations arising from within the body, is imprecise and spatially ambiguous (p.40). 
For instance, the pain of a heart attack may originate on the left side of the chest, but quickly 
travels down an arm or to the jaw. This lack of precision in interoceptive language may be due in 
part to the structure of the peripheral nervous system, which sends diffuse signals from visceral 
organs to the brain and radiates sensations to connected areas through phenomena such as 
referred pain (Leder, 1990, p. 41). Given the ambiguity of internal sensations, current 
psychological theories suggest that prior conceptual knowledge and beliefs about the emotions 
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may play a critical role in helping individuals evaluate their internal signals (e.g Chanes & 
Barrett, 2017; MacCormack & Lindquist, 2017). Yet, little work examines the nature of beliefs 
about interoceptive bodily signals. Specifically, no known work to date examines the relation 
between interoceptive beliefs and emotion, nor examines how interoceptive beliefs may relate to 
individual differences in interoceptive ability and sympathetic nervous system reactivity.  
 In the present study, we develop a preliminary measure of interoceptive body signal 
beliefs and examine how such beliefs relate to trait interoceptive ability (measured in a first 
session) and sympathetic nervous system reactivity and affective stress during a stress induction 
task (during a follow-up session). This study is inspired by psychological constructionist models 
of the mind, which state that emotions, along with all other mental events, emerge from more 
basic psychological processes (e.g., Lindquist, 2013). Here, we focus on two specific 
psychological processes: core affect and conceptual knowledge about interoceptive signals and 
emotion categories. Below, we review the theory of constructed emotion as a theoretical 
framework for studying variation in emotion. We then use the theory of constructed emotion to 
examine the nature of core affect, interoceptive ability, and interoceptive beliefs to generate 
relevant hypotheses for the interaction of these constructs as operationalized within this study. 
The Theory of Constructed Emotion (TCE) 
 The idea that knowledge about bodily signals may influence variability in individual 
instances of emotion is consistent with psychological constructionist theories. Psychological 
constructionist theories propose that emotions arise from the combination of more basic 
psychological “components.” These components are domain-general and not themselves specific 
to emotion (Russell, 2003; Gendron and Barrett, 2009; Barrett, 2006, Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist 
& Barrett, 2012). Prior neuroimaging meta-analyses (e.g. Korber et al., 2008; Lindquist, Satpute, 
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Wager, Weber, & Barrett, 2015; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau & Barrett, 2012; 
Oosterwijk et al., 2012) identify several intrinsic brain networks that activate across emotions 
and other psychological experiences, and which may help constitute the more basic 
psychological components predicted by the TCE.  
Key components identified include exteroceptive representations of stimuli outside the 
body (e.g. vision, audition, olfaction), somatosensory and interoceptive representations of stimuli 
within the body (in part, helping generate core affect— how pleasant or unpleasant, activated or 
deactivated one feels from moment to moment), and broader processes that stimulate, encode, 
and retrieve prior conceptual knowledge, such as language, memory, and attention. The TCE 
suggests that the brain actively draws on these components to predict and “construct” a given 
instance of emotion (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015). As 
noted above, the TCE hypothesizes that two psychological components, core affect and 
conceptual knowledge, play a particularly integral role in producing given instances of emotion 
(Barrett, 2006; 2017). These two components are described in more detail below. 
 Core affect. Core affect is not only a key component in instances of emotion, but also in 
other psychological phenomenon such as verbal communication, decision-making, and 
stereotyping (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell, 2009). Core affect refers to central 
representations of the body’s ongoing allostatic state, including the incorporation of low-level 
processes involved in homeostatic maintenance (e.g. hunger, inflammation, and fatigue) as well 
as more specific visceral sensations generated by action on the autonomic nervous system (e.g., 
Bliss-Moreau & Barrett, 2009; MacCormack & Lindquist, 2017).  
In this process, the brain receives spinal lamina projections from the peripheral nervous 
system, encodes and refines representations of those peripheral sensations, and translates this 
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peripheral feedback into centralized representations of “affect” or feelings of 
pleasure/displeasure (valence) and physiological activation/deactivation (arousal). Through this 
process, core affect serves as a heuristic or generalized representation of the body’s ongoing 
internal state (Lindquist, 2013; MacCormack & Lindquist, 2017), thus allowing the brain to 
monitor key physiological changes and update its predictions about how an organism needs to 
respond to an environmental challenge. 
Although core affect can directly represent bodily symptoms (e.g. a rapidly beating 
heart), in emotion and psychological literature, it generally refers to the subjective dimensions of 
valence and arousal. While the two dimensions vary independently of each other, we seldom 
experience valence without noticing the degree of arousal, and vice versa; thus, it is the 
combination of these dimensions that produces the unified component of component of core 
affect (Barrett & Russell, 1999). Although we experience emotion categories as unique and 
discrete, each discrete emotion does not form a distinctive corresponding dimension of core 
affect (Lindquist, 2013). Rather, core affect is considered “core” in part because the dimensions 
of valence and arousal underlie all discrete emotion (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Lindquist, 
2013).  
In the present paper, there are two ways in which we operationalize core affect: (1) 
sympathetic reactivity— the “raw” signals or changes in the sympathetic nervous system from a 
neutral baseline— and (2) interoceptive ability— one’s ability to objectively detect changes in 
the body. Below we briefly describe each construct and its relation to core affect and instances of 
emotion.  
 Sympathetic reactivity. Colloquially, the sympathetic nervous system is known as the 
“fight” or “flight” branch of the autonomic nervous system (ANS), preparing the body to 
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respond to a perceived threat and change in a given situation through a series of stereotypical 
responses (e.g. elevated heart rate, pupillary dilation, constricted blood vessels, etc.). In emotion 
theory, classical approaches to emotion argue that emotion “families” (i.e. responses like 
aggression or anxiety) have distinct shared patterns of ANS activity that are consistently present 
and specific to that particular emotion type, also known as autonomic differentiation (e.g. 
Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Levenson, 2011). However, psychophysiological 
research demonstrates several limitations to the idea that physiological responses are specific to 
emotion categories, notably that different mental events (e.g. day-dreaming, studying for exams, 
or instances of sadness.) may yield similar physiological responses (Cacioppo & Tassinary, 
1990).  
On the other hand, the TCE (Barrett, 2017) hypothesizes that activity of the ANS during 
an instance of an emotion is tailored to fit the specific demands of the situation and will also 
reflect individual differences in terms of reactivity and learned associations. Recent meta-
analytic work covering all extant psychophysiological studies on emotion found that patterns of 
ANS activity are highly variable within emotion categories and exhibit several similarities across 
emotion categories that may tap into more basic dimensions such as approach or avoidance, 
arousal, and threat versus challenge, but not specific emotion categories per se (Siegel et al., 
2017).  
 Given these meta-analytic findings, we did not seek to assess specific patterns of 
autonomic responses in the present study. Instead, we focused on one particular metric—
sympathetic reactivity during a stressor from a neutral baseline — as a way to assess individual 
differences in reactivity during a stressful situation.    
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Interoceptive ability. It is one thing to experience strong sympathetic reactions to a 
stressor, but more recent work suggests that it is another thing entirely to actually pick up on 
these bodily changes accurately, i.e., interoceptive ability. Evidence from neuroimaging studies 
indicates that several brain regions support this subjective evaluation of the physiological 
condition of the body (Craig, 2002). A PET study examining how people discriminate between 
incremental changes in temperature found that participants’ ratings of perceived stimulus 
intensity did not strongly correlate with the actual temperature of the stimulus. However, 
participants’ ratings did strongly correlate with activity in the right anterior insular and the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Craig, 2002). Similarly, one neuroimaging study found that activity in the 
right anterior insular/opercular cortex predicted participants’ accuracy in a heartbeat detection 
task, a standard measure of interoceptive ability (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 
2004).  
Individual differences in levels of interoceptive ability could explain some of the variance 
between individuals’ emotional experiences. The idea that interoceptive ability can shape the 
experience of emotion is salient in psychological constructionist theories as early as the James-
Lange theory, which proposes that emotions are the subjective experience of physiological 
changes.  Recent studies using heartbeat detection tasks (objective measures of ability) support 
James’ and Lange’s early hypothesis, finding positive correlations between interoceptive ability 
and self-reported intensity of emotion (e.g., Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004; 
Critchley et al., 2004; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). Moreover, greater interoceptive 
ability is negatively associated with features of alexithymia, a trait characterized by difficulties in 
identifying and describing one's emotions (Herbert, Herbert & Pollatos, 2011).  Furthermore, 
other work suggests that brain regions supporting general interoceptive awareness are also 
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associated with emotional awareness and processing self-reference (e.g.  Craig, 2009; Critchley, 
2005). 
Research also indicates that greater interoceptive ability may allow individuals to make 
accurate inferences about the affective state of others. Studies show that greater interoception 
predicts increased experiences of empathy, and individuals with greater interoceptive ability are 
more socially and self-aware, more altruistic, and even make more accurate “gut” decisions, such 
as on the stock market trading floor (e.g., see Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011; Ferri, 
Ambrosecchia, & Gallese, 2013; Ainley, Tajadura-Jimenez, Fotopoulou, & Tsakiris, 2012; Piech 
et al., 2017; Melloni et al., 2013), with the caveat that some of this literature is quite new with 
mixed findings (e.g., Ainley, Maister, & Tsakiris, 2015 find no link between interoception and 
empathy). Although some researchers consider greater interoceptive awareness to be a beneficial 
skill (e.g., Mehling et al., 2013), plenty of other work also shows that interoception may have a 
“dark side” that can also be just as detrimental to individuals’ emotional wellbeing and 
resilience. For example, a recent review highlighted that across the literature, greater 
interoception usually predicts higher stress responses across a variety of stressors (Schulz & 
Vogele, 2015).  
Conceptual Knowledge. Conceptual knowledge refers to an individual’s rich 
accumulation of information about a given category, such as an emotion, rooted in prior 
experience and shared knowledge from culture and language (Lindquist, MacCormack, & 
Shablack, 2015). The TCE’s key hypothesis is that core affect is made meaningful using 
conceptual knowledge about emotion categories to construct an instance of emotion.  
Based on prior knowledge (e.g. the situational context, the language one speaks, or 
episodic memory), conceptual knowledge allows the brain to automatically and effortlessly 
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interpret the confluence of otherwise ambiguous stimuli as meaningful instances of emotions 
(Barrett, 2017; Chanes & Barrett, 2017; Lindquist, 2013). In this way, conceptual knowledge 
acts as a priori information by allowing the brain to understand and make inferences about 
internal sensations. This instantaneous and ongoing “meaning making” produces a continuous 
stream of constructed brain states that may sometimes emerge as instances of discrete emotions 
(e.g. happiness, anger, disgust, fear, etc; Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, MacCormack & Shablack, 
2015), but at other times emerge as other mental events such as problem-solving, auditory 
perception, or concentration. 
Importantly differences in conceptual knowledge may help create meaningful variation 
within and between individuals’ emotional experiences. Conceptual knowledge can direct or 
shift an individual’s attention to specific aspects of a given situation or experience, in turn 
reinforcing one’s existing categories and associations (e.g. Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2015; 
Kövecses, 2003). One such area where conceptual knowledge may direct people’s attention is 
their knowledge about bodily signals in relation to emotion experience, as well as their beliefs 
about what those bodily signals mean.  
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of research regarding how conceptual knowledge about 
interoceptive bodily signals might relate to sympathetic reactivity, interoceptive ability, and the 
experience of emotion. In general, previous literature examining body beliefs focus on negative 
body image beliefs (e.g. Fredrickson & Robertson, 1997; Thompson & Stice, 2001) versus 
appreciation for the body’s functionality (e.g. Alleva, Martijin, Jansen, & Nederkorn, 2014). 
However, to our knowledge, no one has yet studied how beliefs about internal bodily signals 
could predict emotional experiences. 
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The Present Study 
The present study examines how individual differences in beliefs about bodily signals, 
sympathetic reactivity, and interoceptive ability predict self-reported negative affect and somatic 
intensity. During the first session of the study, we use a heartbeat detection task as a measure of 
interoceptive ability and a newly-developed questionnaire assessing people’s beliefs about their 
bodily signals. In a follow-up session, we induce acute stress using the Trier Social Stress Task 
(TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) and collect continuous measures of 
sympathetic reactivity as well as self-report data on emotional and somatic intensity immediately 
following the task.  
Guided by the TCE, we hypothesize that there would be a significant interaction between 
one’s beliefs about bodily signals and sympathetic reactivity, such that the interaction of more 
negative body signal beliefs and greater sympathetic reactivity would predict greater self-
reported negative affect and somatic intensity during the stress induction task. On the other hand, 
we predicted that more positive body signal beliefs would buffer the effect of sympathetic 
reactivity on negative affect and somatic intensity experienced during the TSST.  Moreover, we 
predicted that interoceptive ability will moderate this interaction such that greater interoceptive 
ability would amplify self-reported negative affect and somatic intensity, above and beyond the 
interaction between body signal beliefs and sympathetic reactivity. As this is a preliminary 
investigation into the confluence of these constructs, we also collected exploratory measures of 
interoceptive sensibility (how interoceptive individuals believe that they themselves are) and 
self-report measures of emotional awareness and regulation to see how our body signal beliefs 
items mapped on to these valid constructs. 
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Method  
Participants 
104 participants were recruited from the undergraduate student participant pool within 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Department of Psychology and Neuroscience 
(40.4% European American; 51% female; Mage = 19.3 years, SDage=1.27; See Table 1 for a full 
reporting of relevant demographic data). Potential participants were excluded during pre-
screening if they reported current or past diagnosis of psychiatric illness (e.g. mood, personality, 
or social anxiety disorders), a history of substance use, diagnosis of a heart condition (e.g., 
murmur), or the presence of a pacemaker. High body fat percentage impedes accurate 
electrocardiogram measurement (Frank, Colliver, & Frank, 1986); consequently, we excluded 
individuals with a BMI over 33 during pre-screening. In addition to pre-screening, we carefully 
monitored participants at the start of each study session to eliminate further physiological 
confounds. Specifically, pre-screened individuals could only participate at the scheduled session 
if they did not consume alcohol, caffeine, and/or excess sugar within three hours prior to arrival 
at the laboratory. Additionally, participants could not eat a heavy meal or engage in strenuous 
exercise within the hour previous to arrival. Upon completion of both study sessions, participants 
were compensated Psychology 101 class credit for their time.  
Procedure 
Participants completed two separate sessions, each at least one week but no more than 
one month apart. At Session 1, participants completed the modified Whitehead heartbeat 
detection task as a measure of their interoceptive ability. See Measures below for description of 
the task. They also completed questionnaire measures assessing individual differences in 
emotion concept knowledge. At Session 2, participants completed the Trier Social Stress Test 
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(TSST) to induce a high arousal, negative affective state. We collected continuous measures of 
psychophysiological data throughout the task to assess participants’ sympathetic reactivity. 
Participants also completed questionnaire measures at Session 2 allowing us to assess individual 
differences in emotional and somatic intensity.  
Session 1. Upon arrival, participants completed a “Daily Health Inventory” questionnaire 
which asks about the participant’s last meal, recent caffeine intake, recent strenuous physical 
activity, recent illicit drug use and other criteria that may alter one’s psychophysiological 
responses. Once fulfilling the requirements of the “Daily Health Inventory,” the experimenter 
instructed participants to read the General Consent form for Sessions 1 and 2. After obtaining 
informed consent, participants completed an open-ended “Feelings Report” which asked 
participants to self-report their general “feelings” (i.e. mood, bodily sensations, thoughts, etc.) in 
that moment. Next, the experimenter prepared participants for baseline psychophysiological data 
collection by attaching three electrocardiogram (ECG) electrode sensors to the participant.  
Following five minutes of baseline data collection, participants were randomly assigned 
to first complete either the heartbeat detection task or a conceptual knowledge questionnaire 
block and reaction-time association task not pertinent to the analysis of this study. The 
administration of the heartbeat detection task was counterbalanced in order to control for order 
effects (e.g., attending to interoceptive sensations might make interoceptive associations more 
accessible during self-reports). The administration of the questionnaire block first versus the 
reaction time task first was also counterbalanced in order to control for order effects. The 
questionnaire block included the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness, 
Body Awareness Questionnaire, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, the Trait Emotional Clarity 
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Scale, two subscales from the Common Mental Disorders Questionnaire, and a “Body Signal 
Beliefs” questionnaire we created for the present study.  
Session 2. As in Session 1, participants completed the “Daily Health Inventory” 
questionnaire upon arrival. Once fulfilling the requirements of the “Daily Health Inventory,” 
participants completed the open-ended “Feelings Report,” as in Session 1. Next, the 
experimenter prepared individuals for psychophysiological data collection by attaching electrode 
sensors for ECG and cardiac impedance. The experimenter also attached a blood pressure arm 
band and finger cuff to participant’s non-dominant hand. After five minutes of baseline data 
collection, participants received a Session 2 “Stressful Task” consent form which described the 
procedure Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993).  After obtaining informed 
consent, two “interviewers” (trained confederates) entered the room to describe the task. The 
experimenter and interviewers explained the task as an assessment of individuals’ cognitive 
performance under pressure.  
The TSST consists of three sections: (a) the 2-minute speech preparation period, (b) the 
10-minute speech task, and (c) the “impromptu” 5-minute mental arithmetic task (Akinola & 
Mendes, 2008; Kubzanzky et al., 2012). The interviewers administered the tasks while the 
experimenter recorded participant’s psychophysiological data was for the duration of the TSST. 
Interviewers left the study room immediately following the TSST. The experimenter 
administered a series of questionnaires measuring participant’s self-reported emotional and 
somatic experience during the TSST, including another open-ended “Feelings Report,” the 
PANAS-circumplex questionnaire and a Somatic Sensations questionnaire created for the study. 
These questionnaires provided measures of participant’s subjective emotional intensity, intensity 
of somatic sensations, and judgement of the TSST interviewers. While the participant completed 
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these questionnaire, the experimenter recorded participant’s psychophysiological recovery 
response for five minutes. During Session 2, participants completed two additional tasks not 
pertinent to the analysis in this study. Participants were debriefed on the purpose of the study at 
the end of the session.  
 Session 1 Measures  
Body Signal Beliefs Questionnaire (BSBQ). As part of the questionnaire block, 
participants responded to a 12-item “body signal beliefs” set of questions that we added to our 
study as a first step to document potential positive and negative beliefs people have about their 
bodily signals.  We generated questions thought to capture the extent to which one attends to, 
indulges, and handles their interoceptive sensations or signals. This measure was loosely inspired 
by the Parents’ Beliefs about Children’s Emotions Questionnaire, a comprehensive, multi-
faceted measure created to examine how maladaptive parental emotional socialization impacts a 
child’s socioemotional outcomes and well-being (Halbersadt et al., 2013). Similarly, the BSBQ 
was created to examine how potentially maladaptive vs. beneficial beliefs about interoceptive 
sensations impact one’s socioemotional and overall well-being. Participants responded to items 
including “I believe my body is a source of wisdom,” “I believe it is important to control my 
bodily urges completely,” and “Sometimes I’m afraid of my bodily feelings,” on a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (“not at all true of me”) to 7 (“extremely true of me”). See Results for 
description of how we created mean scores to represent positive vs. negative body signal beliefs. 
Heartbeat detection task (HBD; Kleckner, Wormwood, Simmons, Barrett, & 
Quigley, 2015; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977). Participants completed 
the modified Whitehead heartbeat detection task as an objective measure of interoceptive 
sensitivity. The task was administered using BioLab v. 3.0.8–3.0.13 and a MATLAB program 
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with Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007). The 
program automatically generated tones based on participant’s ventricular contractions (the R 
spike), determined by calculating amplitude threshold calculated during baseline. Each trial 
consisted of 10 tones that either coincided with the participant’s heartbeat (200 ms after the R-
spike) or did not coincide with participant’s heartbeat (500 ms after the R-spike). The researchers 
instructed the participant to notice whether the tones coincided with their heartbeart or not. 
Participants could not use the chair, their hand, or another object but instead were instructed to 
rely on their judgement. After each trial, participants indicated whether or not the tones 
coincided with their heartbeat as well as how confident they were in their response.  
The program randomly administered the 200-ms and 500-ms trials for a total of 3 practice 
trials and 60 target trials. Prior to Kleckner et al. (2015), little work examined the optimal 
number of trials needed to have sufficient statistical power for scoring while not burdening the 
participant; for instance, in Whitehead et al. (1977) participants ran 200 trials. Kleckner et al. 
(2015) found that 40-60 trials established sufficient reliability; thus, we used 60 trials. If the 
participant responds “yes” to a trial in which the tones coincided with their heartbeat, the 
program records their response as a “hit;” if the participant responded “no,” the program records 
their response as a “miss.” If the participant responds “no” to a trial in which the tones did not 
coincide with their heartbeat, their response is recorded as a “correct rejection” occurred; if they 
said “yes,” their response is recorded as a “false alarm.” For our analysis, we use the sensitivity 
index, or d’, of the participant’s heartbeat detection task score as an index of interoceptive 
ability. The sensitivity index is computed by subtracting the z-score of individuals’ false alarms 
from the z-score of their hits, as is standardly done in signal detection models when computing 
d’. 
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Interoceptive sensibility questionnaires. In addition to administering an objective 
measure of participant’s interoceptive ability, we also collected data on participant’s 
interoceptive sensibility (Garfinkel et. al., 2015), that is, how interoceptive individuals think that 
they are. These measures allowed us to analyze the relationship between interoceptive body 
signals beliefs, actual interoceptive ability, and perceived interoceptive ability.  
Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ; Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1989; α=.83). The 
BAQ is an 18-item self-report measure of perceived interoceptive ability. The scale was 
developed in response to the paucity of questionnaires measuring individual’s attentiveness to 
general bodily sensations not associated with somatic or emotional psychopathology. This scale 
demonstrated no significant correlation between BAQ score and measures of hypochondriasis, 
trait anxiety, trait neuroticism, or self-esteem (Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1989), suggesting that 
it taps into individuals’ general self-reported awareness of bodily sensations. Items include 
questions regarding normal bodily sensations such as “I can distinguish between tiredness that's 
caused by hunger and tiredness that's caused by a lack of sleep” and “I know in advance when 
I'm getting the flu.” Participants respond to items on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (“not at all true 
of me”) to 7 (“very true of me”). 
 Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA; Mehling et al., 
2012; α=.85). The MAIA is a 32-item self-report measure of interoceptive body awareness. 
Originally validated using feedback from instructors of mind-body therapies (e.g. Tai Chi, yoga, 
mindfulness meditation), the MAIA measures one’s attentiveness and comfort with bodily 
sensations. The MAIA includes five overall dimensions of interoceptive awareness represented 
by eight subscales: noticing (awareness of bodily sensations), not distracting (accepting 
sensations of discomfort rather than use distraction to cope), not worrying (tendency not to 
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experience emotional distress as physical discomfort), attention regulation (ability to attend to 
bodily sensations), emotional awareness (ability to attribute bodily sensations to emotional 
experiences), self-regulation (ability to regulate distress by attending to bodily sensations), body 
listening (tendency to actively listen to the body for information), and trusting (experiencing the 
body as safe and trustworthy). Participants respond to items including “I notice how my body 
changes when I am angry” and “I feel that my body is a safe place” on 6-point Likert scale from 
0 (“never”) to 5 (“always”).  
Common Mental Disorders – Screening Questionnaire (CMDQ; Christensen et al., 
2005; Sogaard & Bech, 2009; α=.87). The CMDQ is a 36-item mental disorder diagnostic aid 
originally designed for use in primary care settings. The questionnaire is composed of six 
subscales covering signs and symptoms associated with somatoform disorders, anxiety disorders, 
depressive disorders and alcohol use disorder as defined by the International Classification of 
Diseases-10, as well as a final question about the patient's overall health.  
In the present study, we used the 19 items from two subscales, the somatoform disorder 
“symptom checklist” and the somatoform disorder “illness worry” scale, to measure participant’s 
tendencies to over-report somatic sensations or interpret emotional distress as physiological 
symptoms. The subscales ask participants, “During the last four weeks, how much were you 
bothered with...” items including “headaches” and “a lump in your throat” as well as “worries 
about the possibility of having a serious illness” and “thoughts that your doctor may be wrong.” 
Participants responded to the total 19 items on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 4 
(“extremely”). 
Emotional awareness questionnaires. In addition to collecting self-reported data on 
participant’s interoceptive sensibility, we also utilized two measures assessing individual’s self-
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reported emotional awareness. These allow us to analyze individual differences in participants’ 
self-reported emotional clarity and awareness. Additionally, including these measures in our 
analyses allowed us to account for dispositional difficulties in determining how one feels. 
Trait Emotional Clarity (Bodena & Berenbaum, 2011; α=.80). The Trait Emotional 
Clarity is a 20-item measure of emotional clarity, or the extent to which one can identify, 
distinguish between and understand their feelings. Contrary to previous literature, the scale treats 
emotional clarity as a two-dimensional construct representing both the extent to which one know 
the causes of their emotions (source awareness) and the extent to which one can identify and 
distinguish between the types of emotions they experience (type awareness). This study only 
utilizes the “type awareness” facet of the Trait Emotional Clarity scale. Participants responded to 
the 12-items on this subscale including, “My beliefs and opinions can sometimes change 
depending on how I feel” and “I am often confused about which emotion I am feeling” on a 5-
point Likert scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1993; α=.80). The TAS-
20 is 20-item measure of alexithymia, a subclinical psychological construct marked by deficits in 
identifying, describing, and distinguishing one’s emotions. In the present study, we use the TAS 
as a measure of low emotional awareness. The measure is comprised of three subscales 
representing the three facets of alexithymia: difficulties in identifying feelings, difficulty in 
describing feelings, and externally oriented thinking. Participants responded to items including, 
“It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings” and “Being in touch with emotions 
is essential” on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly 
agree”). 
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Emotion regulation questionnaire. Beyond assessing self-reported interoceptive 
sensibility and emotional awareness, we also wanted to asses a more tangible outcome like 
emotion regulation, as an exploratory assessment for our novel body signal beliefs questionnaire.  
Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007; α=.44). 
The Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy is a 10-item measure developed to assess if implicit 
theories of emotion and their social outcomes were mediated by beliefs about one’s ability to 
change one’s emotions. The questionnaire asks participants to imagine themselves in 10 separate 
scenarios drawn from normal college life. We included the following 4 scenarios for the 
purposes of this study: “You are about to take an important exam;” “You suddenly run into a 
former boyfriend or girlfriend;” “A teacher or boss criticizes your work;” “You are driving to the 
store when someone cuts you off.” Participants responded to how confident they are in their 
ability to control their emotions in each scenario using a percentage from 0% (“cannot do it at 
all”) to 100% (“certainly can do”).  
Session 2 Measures  
 Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The TSST is a reliable task 
for inducing interpersonal stress and psychophysiological stress responses (Kirschbaum et al., 
1993). As outlined in the procedure, the TSST consists of three sections: (a) a 2-minute speech 
preparation period, (b) a 10-minute speech task, and (c) an “unplanned” 5-minute mental 
arithmetic task (Akinola & Mendes, 2008; Kubzanzky et al., 2012). During the speech-
preparation period, the experimenter left the participant in the study room to mentally prepare 
(i.e. without the use of pen and paper) for the speech; this period was designed to induce 
anticipatory stress. After preparation, the interviewers reentered the room for the participant to 
complete the speech task. For the speech portion of the TSST, participants deliver a continuous 
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speech detailing their “dream job,” past experience relevant to the participant’s chosen job, and 
their strengths and weaknesses as a person. If the participant stopped speaking before the 10-
minute mark, the interviewers used a series of “follow-up questions” to ensure participant 
engagement for the duration of the task. After the speech, the interviewers introduced a mental 
arithmetic task, of which participants had not previously been aware. The participant performed 
the mental arithmetic task at an appropriate level of difficulty for five minutes, though 
interviewers did not state that the task was time limited.  
The interviewers remained as neutral as possible, giving neither feedback nor engaging in 
conversation for the duration of the TSST. Interviewers took notes on participants’ body 
language and notable verbal responses as a qualitative measure of stress. Additionally, 
participants were told that their speech would be audio and video recorded and coded by experts 
in the field of non-verbal communication, to increase stress.  
Psychophysiological measures.  We utilized BioLab acquisition software from 
MindWare Technologies (Columbus, OH) to collect continuous measures of electrocardiography 
(ECG), impedance cardiography (ICG), and blood pressure for the 5 minute baseline period prior 
to negative affect induction, the duration of the TSST, and for the 5 minute recovery period. 
Recording these three measures in conjunction provides insight into participants’ sympathetic 
nervous system response, as well as the parasympathetic nervous system’s down-regulation of 
the sympathetic system.  
ECG was used to measure heart rate (HR) and the inter-beat interval as indices of 
electrical changes associated with different phases in the heartbeat cycle. ICG was used to 
measure cardiac output, stroke volume, respiratory sinus arrhythmia, stroke volume, left 
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ventricular ejection time, and pre-ejection period. Blood pressure was used to measured diastolic 
pressure, systolic pressure, and total resistance pressure.  
Given that ECG, ICG, and blood pressure represent disparate aspects of the 
cardiovascular cycle and output, it is not generally acceptable to concatenate across indices. 
Instead, psychophysiologists assess each index or choose one measure they wish to focus on.  In 
the present study, we focused on pre-ejection period or PEP as our primary variable of interest, 
as PEP is the purest measure of sympathetic activity in peripheral psychophysiology literature, 
with shorter PEP intervals corresponding to greater sympathetic activity (Sherwood et al., 1990; 
Dekker, Geenen, Godaert, Bijlsma, van Doornen, 2004). PEP represents the time from 
ventricular depolarization to when the left ventricle ejects blood. Sympathetic reactivity with 
PEP was calculated by creating a mean score of the first minutes from the speech prep, prep, and 
math tasks (“the ‘most active’ period”) and subtracting the last minute of baseline (“the ‘most 
relaxed’ period”; Jamieson, Nock, Mendes, 2012).  
Post-TSST questionnaires.  In addition to collecting psychophysiological data as an 
index of participants’ physiological reactivity to acute stress, we were interest in measuring the 
self-reported emotional and somatic intensity of participant’s experiences during the TSST. 
However, as we could not assess self-report during the task itself, participants reported how they 
had felt during the TSST immediately after the task ended.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Circumplex (PANAS; adapted from Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is a 30 item self-report measure comprised of two mood 
scales: a positive affect scale and a negative affective scale. Items of the scales include both 
discrete emotions (e.g. “proud,” “afraid,”) and affective states (e.g. “jittery,” “sluggish”). 
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Participants rated how intensely and how clearly they experienced the emotional and affective 
states during the TSST on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 6 (“extremely”).  
Affective Appraisals Questionnaire. To assess participants’ affective appraisals during 
the speech and math portions of the Trier Social Stress Task, participants completed a 25-item 
measure. Each item on the measure describes a different affect-relevant thought or cognition 
(e.g. how much did one feel “insulted,” “cheated,” “challenged,” “uninterested,” etc.). 
Participants indicated the extent to which they experienced each thought or cognition on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 6 (“extremely”). We included these appraisals 
as an additional index of affect in the study because it taps into the affective meaning-making 
and types of cognitions that individuals are experiencing as a result of the brain’s 
conceptualization of core affect.  
Somatic Sensations (α=.90). The Somatic Sensations questionnaire is a 42-item measure 
developed to assess an individual’s self-reported experience of physiological sensations. This 
was a novel measure developed for this study, as no prior measures exist to assess somatic 
sensations during emotions or stress. We used the scale as an index of participant’s somatic 
intensity during the Trier Social Stress Test. The measure includes seven facets of somatic 
sensations including cardiac changes (e.g. “heart palpitations”), gastric changes (e.g. “pit in your 
stomach”), respiratory changes (e.g. “rapid or difficulty breathing”), kinesthetic changes (e.g. 
“body or limbs feeling heavy”), temperature changes (e.g. “flushed or hot”), and arousal state 
changes (e.g. “energized”). Participants rated how intensely they experienced these sensations 
during the TSST on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 6 (“extremely”).  
Task Rating. To measure if the Trier Social Stress Task did, in fact, induce acute stress 
participants completed a 6-item manipulation check measure. The task rating questionnaire asked 
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participants to rate how difficult, stressful, or enjoyable they found the speech and math portions 
of the TSST. Participants responded to each item on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“not 
at all”) to 6 (“extremely”). 
Results 
Data preparation. Data were obtained from 104 participants at Session 1. Nineteen 
participants did not attend Session 2, contributing to an attrition rate of 18.3%. We performed 
hypothesis testing on the remaining 83 individuals who completed both Session 1 and Session 2. 
All variables of interest were distributed normally (see Table 2 for the means, standard 
deviations and ranges for key measures), with some mild skew for the self-reported emotions and 
somatic sensations (i.e., people did not overall report extremely intense experiences). We 
calculated sympathetic reactivity with PEP by creating a mean score of the first minutes from the 
speech prep, prep, and math tasks and subtracting the last minute of baseline. We calculated 
negative affect (α= .87) by creating a mean score of individual’s self-reported negative emotions 
and negative appraisals in response to the Trier Social Stress Task. 
Testing the structure of body signal beliefs. Before testing the relation of sympathetic 
reactivity, body signal beliefs, and interoceptive ability, we first determined the factor structure 
and reliability of our novel Body Signal Beliefs Questionnaire (BSBQ). Initial inter-correlational 
analyses demonstrated that most items within the measure significantly correlated with each 
other (see Table 3 for correlations).  
We then conducted an exploratory factor analysis of the 12 items. We performed oblique 
rotations in accordance with the predictions that items would moderately inter-correlate (See 
Table 5 for final pattern matrix). Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 2.93, explaining 24.4% of the 
total variance. Factor 2 had an eigenvalue of 2.09, explaining 17.4% of the total variance. Factor 
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3 had an eigenvalue of 1.06, explaining 10.0% of the variance and Factor 4 had an eigenvalue of 
1.06, explaining 8.86% of the total variance. Both traditional eigenvalue rules and scree tests can 
be used to quantify the number of factor to retain (Cattell, 1966), but it is not typical to retain 
factors with only one to two loaded items. Both Factors 3 and 4 also only had small eigenvalues 
(i.e. just above 1.00). Thus, we eliminated Factors 3 and 4 and retained Factors 1 and 2 as our 
primary measures.   
Closer examination of Factors 1 and 2 showed that the factors differed primarily on 
valence—with Factor 1, our strongest factor, representing negative beliefs about body signals 
(e.g., “Listening to bodily sensations can be problematic.”). The second and smaller factor, 
Factor 2, tapped more into positive beliefs about body signals (e.g., “My body is a source of 
wisdom.”). One item, “My body is an intense place” loaded on both the negative and positive 
factors, but it loaded highest on the positive body signal beliefs. 
Thus, we created two mean scores: a negative body signal beliefs score (6 items, α= .72) 
and a positive body signal beliefs score (3 items, α= .66). See Table 3 for final items included in 
each mean score, along with which items were excluded (from Factors 3 and 4).   
Correlational Analysis of Key Variables 
In addition to examining descriptive statistics, we used bivariate correlations to determine 
if there were any significant associations between positive and negative body signal beliefs, 
sympathetic reactivity, interoceptive ability, and negative affect or somatic intensity during the 
TSST (see Table 9).  
First, we found that sympathetic reactivity during the TSST from a neutral baseline, as 
measured by pre-ejection period (PEP), was not significantly associated with positive nor 
negative beliefs about bodily signals (ps= .48, .56 respectively). Additionally, PEP reactivity 
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was not significantly correlated with interoceptive ability (p= .22). This suggests that there is 
some independence in how sympathetically reactive individuals are, regardless of their beliefs 
about bodily signals or their interoceptive ability. However, PEP reactivity is positively and 
significantly correlated with negative affect self-reported during the TSST (r= .39, p= .001) and 
marginally, positively associated with somatic intensity self-reported during the TSST (r= .20, 
p= .099). This suggests that individuals with more reactive sympathetic nervous systems during 
the TSST also reported significantly higher negative affect and perhaps also greater somatic 
intensity.  
 Turning to positive and negative bodily signal beliefs, both mean scores are correlated 
with each other—but interestingly, this association is positive (r= .20, p= .043). This may 
suggest that positive and negative beliefs, at least as we have measured them, are not necessarily 
orthogonal. This makes sense—where people may hold a mixture of both positive and negative 
beliefs about their bodily signals, rather than “either-or” for their beliefs. Positive body signal 
beliefs did not correlate with greater PEP reactivity nor greater interoceptive ability (ps= .48, .48 
respectively), neither did positive beliefs correlate with negative affect or somatic intensity 
during the TSST (ps= .79, .75). On the other hand, negative body signal beliefs, although not 
correlated with PEP reactivity (p= .56), was indeed correlated with interoceptive ability (r= .35, 
p= .004). This may suggest that people who are more interoceptively accurate also hold more 
negative beliefs about their bodily signals. Like the positive beliefs, negative beliefs did not 
correlate with negative affect or somatic intensity during the TSST (ps= .24, .13). The fact that 
neither of our body signal beliefs measures correlate with our outcomes of interest was surprising 
to us, given the TCE, but may suggest that the mere presence of these beliefs is not sufficiently 
powerful to act on our feelings or experiences.  
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Finally, interoceptive ability, as noted above, was not associated with PEP reactivity or 
positive signal beliefs, but was significantly correlated with negative beliefs. Against our 
predictions, interoceptive ability was not associated with negative affect nor somatic intensity 
during the TSST (ps= .44, .82), suggesting that trait interoceptive accuracy may not be related to 
increased affective stress (although as our sample is small, this is hard to reconcile against the 
large review of findings in Schulz & Vögele, 2015).  
Hypothesis Testing 
Although not all of our hypotheses were borne out in the correlational analyses, we 
proceeded with our a priori determined regression analyses which allow us to parse apart the 
unique effects of sympathetic reactivity, body signal beliefs, and interoceptive ability, as well as 
their interactions. We reasoned that although sympathetic reactivity may prove to be a key driver 
of affective stress and emotions (as shown in the correlations), it may be that body signal beliefs 
and interoception might amplify or buffer the relation between sympathetic reactivity and 
negative affect / somatic intensity.  More specifically, we thought that positive body signal 
beliefs might buffer or mute the relation between sympathetic reactivity and affective stress 
while negative body signal beliefs might amplify or exacerbate this relationship.  
 Thus, we ran four hierarchical regressions (see Tables 5-8). Models 1A and B included 
negative body signal beliefs as a predictor of negative affect and somatic intensity as outcomes 
of interest. Models 2A and B included positive body signal beliefs as a predictor of negative 
affect and somatic intensity as outcomes of interest. We did not examine negative and positive 
signal beliefs in the same models as our sample size is small and we already compute a three-
way interaction between sympathetic reactivity, beliefs (negative or positive), and interoceptive 
ability in each model. Gender was entered as a control in the third and final step of each models, 
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as gender helps control for differences in BMI, sex-related hormones, and other factors that 
might distally influence stress and sympathetic reactivity. Final interpretations are based on this 
third and final model step.  
Model 1A: Regression model with sympathetic reactivity, negative body signal 
beliefs, and interoceptive ability predicting negative affect. The overall full model predicting 
an individual’s self-reported negative affect during the Trier Social Stress Task (see Table 5) was 
significant, F(8, 59) = 6.81, p < .001, R2 =.43. The first model step, containing PEP, negative 
beliefs, and the interaction between PEP and negative beliefs, was significant, F(3, 59) = 9.69 p 
< .001, R2=.34. Initially, both PEP and negative beliefs positively predicted negative affect 
(bs=.55, .37, ps=.006, .050). However, the interaction between PEP and negative beliefs was not 
significant in the initial step.  
 Adding interoceptive ability in the second model step did not result in a significant model 
change (p= .42). No main effects or interactions were significant in this step of the model (all ps 
> .10).    
The addition of gender in the third and final step of the model resulted in a marginal 
model change (p= .062). Although no main effects were significant, the interaction of negative 
beliefs and interoceptive ability was marginally significant, as was gender (bs= -.34, -.63, ps= 
.08, .06 respectively). 
Thus, while neither sympathetic reactivity, negative beliefs, nor interoceptive ability 
alone nor the three-way interaction between these variables predict negative affect during the 
TSST, results from the final model may suggest that negative body signal beliefs and 
interoceptive ability together may exacerbate negative affect during stress. The direction of 
effects of this marginal interaction suggests that individuals with higher negative body signal 
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beliefs and lower interoceptive ability report more negative affect during the stressor. Follow-up 
probing of the significant interaction supported this interpretation (simple slope was marginally 
different from zero for higher negative beliefs, at t=-1.76, p=0.085). See Figure 1.  
Model 1B:  Regression model with sympathetic reactivity, negative body signal 
beliefs, and interoceptive ability predicting somatic intensity. The overall full model 
predicting an individual’s self-reported negative affect during the Trier Social Stress Task (see 
Table 6) was marginally significant, F(8, 59) = 4.52, p =.088, R2 =.26. The first model step, 
containing PEP, negative beliefs, and the interaction between PEP and negative beliefs, was 
marginally significant, F(3, 59) = 2.43 p =.074, R2=.07. However, neither the main effects of 
PEP and negative beliefs nor the interaction of the two were significant (although the main effect 
of negative beliefs was p= .106).  
 Adding interoceptive ability in the second model step did not result in a significant model 
change (p= .28). However, the addition of interoceptive ability and its related interactions did 
improve estimation of the variables in the first step. PEP emerged as significant (b= .36, p= 
.032). There was also again, as in Model 1A, a significant interaction between negative body 
beliefs and interoceptive ability (b= -.17, p= .048).   
The addition of gender in the third and final step of the model resulted in no significant 
model change (p= .17). PEP reactivity remained significant (b= .36, p= .029) as did the 
interaction of negative beliefs x interoceptive ability (b= -.20, p= .027). No other main effects or 
interactions reached significance.  
Thus, these results suggest that sympathetic reactivity may drive perceptions of somatic 
intensity during stress—but also the combination of negative body signal beliefs and 
interoceptive ability may likewise contribute to perceptions of somatic intensity. Follow-up 
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probing of the significant interaction revealed that it was individuals with lower negative beliefs 
and higher interoceptive ability who experienced greater somatic intensity, although this simple 
slope was not significantly different from zero (t= -1.08, p=0.287), limiting the strength of this 
interpretation. See Figure 2.  
Model 2A:  Regression model with sympathetic reactivity, positive body signal 
beliefs, and interoceptive ability predicting negative affect. In the present hierarchical 
regression, all steps in the model were significant, predicting an individual’s self-reported 
negative affect during the Trier Social Stress Task (see Table 7): overall model F(8, 59) = 5.57, p 
< .001, R2 =.47. In the first step, PEP positively predicted negative affect (b= .77, p< .0001). 
Positive beliefs however did not predict negative affect (p= .524). The interaction between PEP 
and positive beliefs together predicted reduced negative affect (b= -.78, p < 0.0001), and 
remained significant in all subsequent steps.  
 The addition of interoceptive ability in the second step of the model resulted in a 
significant change, p= .79. Interoceptive ability, the interaction between interoceptive ability and 
positive beliefs, and the interaction between interoceptive ability and PEP did not predict 
negative affect, and remained nonsignificant in the following step.  
The addition of gender in the third and final step of the model also did not result in a 
significant model change, p= .20. Specifically, PEP reactivity and the interaction between PEP 
and positive beliefs both remained predictive of negative affect (bs= .83 and -.66, p < .0001 and 
p =.021, respectively) when controlling for gender.  
Thus, these results suggest that sympathetic reactivity may drive perceptions of negative 
affect during stress. However, the presence of positive body signal beliefs appears to buffer the 
relation between sympathetic reactivity and negative affect, as predicted. Follow-up probing of 
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the significant interaction supported this interpretation, where those with lower positive beliefs 
about their body signals relative to those with higher positive beliefs reported greater negative 
affect at higher levels of sympathetic reactivity. The simple slope for lower positive beliefs was 
significantly different from zero (t=3.32, p=0.002), but the slope for higher positive beliefs was 
not significantly different from zero. See Figure 3.  
Model 2B:  Regression model with sympathetic reactivity, positive body signal 
beliefs, and interoceptive ability predicting somatic intensity. Neither, the overall model nor 
any of its steps predicting an individual’s self-reported somatic intensity during the Trier Social 
Stress Task (see Table 8) were significant (all ps> .25). Additionally, no main effects or 
interactions were significant at any step of the model, except in the first step, PEP predicted 
greater negative affect as a main effect (b= .15, p= .045). This main effect fell from significance 
in subsequent steps. This lack of findings may suggest that, unlike negative body signal beliefs, 
positive body signal beliefs or their addition to sympathetic reactivity and interoceptive ability 
do not relate to somatic intensity during stress.  
Exploratory Correlational Analysis 
In addition to testing our main hypotheses, we used bivariate correlations to determine if 
there were any significant associations between our key variables and our exploratory measures 
of interoceptive sensibility (measured using the BAQ, the MAIA, and the CMD-SQ) and self-
report measures of emotional awareness and regulation (using the Trait Emotional Clarity, the 
TAS-20, and the Emotional Regulation Self-Efficacy measures)  Indeed, we found several 
significant correlations between our variables of interest and responses to these exploratory 
measures (see Table 9 for full correlational results). Below, we discuss the most interesting 
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findings as relevant to our novel positive and negative body signal beliefs measures as well as 
our study hypotheses.  
 Correlations of negative body signal beliefs with other variables. Individuals who 
reported higher agreement with negative body signal belief items also tended to report greater 
alexithymia and somatization (rs= .32, .34, ps< .001 respectively) and reduced emotional clarity 
(r= -.28, p= .005). Alexithymia and emotional clarity both tap into attention to emotion or the 
ability to label and clearly identify or experience one’s affective states. Additionally, our 
measure of somatization indicates that individuals with greater negative beliefs about their bodily 
signals also may be more likely to misidentify their feelings as illness or other bodily states. As 
such, these findings collectively suggest that individuals with negative body signal beliefs may 
be less likely to pay attention to or may struggle with identifying their feelings. The causal 
relation is unclear here, but it is possible that the negative body signal beliefs may lead 
individuals to habituate suppress or ignore their interoceptive sensations, or interpret their 
sensations in a more negative light, thus impeding emotional awareness. Negative body signal 
beliefs were not significantly correlated with any of our other exploratory measures 
(interoceptive sensibility or regulatory self-efficacy).  
Correlations of positive body signal beliefs with other variables. Individuals who 
rated higher agreement with the positive body signal belief items also endorsed themselves as 
being more attentive to and aware of their interoceptive sensations (this endorsement is 
interoceptive sensibility), as measured by the BAQ and MAIA (rs= .53, .59, ps< .0001 
respectively). These moderately strong, positive associations make sense, given that both the 
BAQ and MAIA may actually tap into positive views towards one’s bodily sensations too (e.g., 
greater comfort with and willingness to pay attention to sensations).  However, positive body 
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signal beliefs were also positively associated with greater somatization (r= .25, p= .010). This 
may suggest that simply having positive views of the body does not necessarily relate to or 
promote greater accuracy or understanding of one’s bodily sensations. People with positive 
beliefs were similarly likely to somaticize relative to those with negative beliefs: the r for 
negative beliefs is .34, but for positive beliefs is .25. Positive body signal beliefs did not 
significantly relate with alexithymia, emotional clarity, or regulatory self-efficacy however.  
 Correlations of sympathetic reactivity and interoceptive ability with other variables. 
Sympathetic reactivity, as measured by PEP, did not correlate at all with any of our other 
exploratory measures of interest, suggesting that, at least in this study, sympathetic reactivity 
during a stressor does not correlate with self-report measures of interoception, emotional clarity, 
alexithymia, somatization, or emotion regulatory self-efficacy.  
On the other hand, we found that interoceptive ability was negatively associated with 
scores on the MAIA (r= -.23, p=0.05), suggesting that greater actual accuracy in detecting 
cardiac signals may not necessarily translate to greater perceived interoceptive ability. 
Additionally, interoceptive ability was negatively associated with regulatory self-efficacy for 
emotions (r=-0.27, p= .024), suggesting that interoceptively accurate individuals were less likely 
to believe that they could effectively regulate their emotions. This may fit with the idea that 
interoceptive individuals experience their bodily sensations as more intense, and therefore may 
also find emotions and the physiological concomitants associated with emotions more difficult to 
manage.  
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine how the confluence of individual differences in 
beliefs about bodily signals, sympathetic reactivity, and interoceptive ability predicted one’s self-
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reported negative affect and somatic intensity during a stressor. The theory of constructed 
emotions (TCE) provides a framework for studying how variation in conceptual knowledge 
about one’s bodily signals and core affect (as assessed using sympathetic reactivity and 
interoceptive ability) play a dynamic role in producing an instance of emotion. However, no 
known previous work in affective science to date investigated the role of positive and negative 
body signal beliefs within the context of emotion nor their interaction with sympathetic reactivity 
and interoceptive ability in predicting self-reported negative affect and somatic intensity.  
Guided by the TCE, we hypothesized that there would be a significant interaction 
between one’s beliefs about bodily signals and sympathetic reactivity, such that the interaction of 
more negative body signal beliefs and greater sympathetic reactivity would predict greater self-
reported negative affect and somatic intensity during the stress induction task. On the other hand, 
more positive body signal beliefs, even in the presence of greater sympathetic reactivity, would 
serve as a buffer between sympathetic reactivity and the negative affect and somatic intensity 
experienced during stress.  Moreover, we predicted that interoceptive ability would moderate this 
interaction such that greater interoceptive ability would amplify self-reported negative affect and 
somatic intensity, above and beyond the interaction between body signal beliefs and sympathetic 
reactivity. 
Although not all of our predictions were fully borne out in the data, three important 
patterns emerged from our hypothesis testing. First, we found preliminary evidence, consistent 
with prior literature, that greater sympathetic reactivity predicts greater negative affect and 
somatic intensity during an affective stressor. However, sympathetic reactivity was only 
sometimes significant in the final steps of the hierarchical regression, suggesting that it may not 
be as central a driver as prior literature suggests. Similarly, contrary to prior literature on stress 
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and interoception, we did not find a significant main effect or even bivariate correlation for 
interoceptive ability in predicting negative affect or somatic intensity. This null effect was 
surprising to us and may suggest that interoception may have a smaller effect on affective stress 
than previously suggested.     
Second, we found marginal evidence that negative body signal beliefs interact with 
interoceptive ability to predict greater negative affect during stress and also stronger evidence 
that this interaction holds when predicting somatic intensity during stress. However, negative 
body signal beliefs did not emerge in interaction with sympathetic reactivity, suggesting—at 
least in the present study—that negative body signal beliefs do not necessarily exacerbate the 
relation between sympathetic activation and negative affect, contrary to predictions.   
Finally, we found evidence that positive body signal beliefs may play a unique role in 
buffering the relation between sympathetic reactivity and negative affect (but not somatic 
intensity) during stress. This effect was robust across all models, suggesting that viewing bodily 
signals more positively may indeed help mitigate how distress one might experience during 
stressors and other emotion-eliciting situations.  This finding supports our initial hypotheses 
about positive body signal beliefs. However, we did not find an interaction between interoceptive 
ability and positive body signal beliefs, contrary to hypotheses.  
In follow up exploratory correlations, we examined concurrent validity for our novel 
body signal beliefs mean scores. Results indicated that individuals who view their bodily signals 
more negatively also struggled to identify their emotions and distinguish their affective states 
from somatic ones. On the other hand, individuals who viewed their bodily signals more 
positively reported greater interoceptive sensibility on the BAQ and MAIA, but also greater 
somatization, suggesting that positive views about one’s bodily signals may promote a more 
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welcoming, accepting, and attentive mindset towards interoceptive sensations, even if it does not 
necessarily promote greater accuracy.  
These findings collectively suggest that the beliefs individuals have about the meaning of 
their bodily signals can play a key role in emotions, in addition to the roles of sympathetic 
reactivity and interoceptive ability.   
Strengths and Limitations 
Our study brought several notable strengths to bear on the present research. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to develop and begin initial validation of a measure on body 
signal beliefs or to assess such a measure in relation to sympathetic reactivity and interoceptive 
ability in the context of emotions. Previous research already demonstrates robust associations 
between patterns of physiological responses within situated instances of emotion and across 
emotion categories (e.g. Mendes, 2016; Siegel et al., 2017). Moreover, research indicates that 
greater that interoceptive ability predicts emotional intensity (e.g. Craig, 2009; Barrett et al., 
2004). While previous research provides evidence that peripheral psychophysiology and 
interoceptive ability play an integral role in the production of emotion, the consideration of the 
interaction between sympathetic reactivity and interoceptive ability in relation to emotion is 
largely understudied. Moreover, no work to date has looked at beliefs about bodily signals 
relate—not only to emotion—but other existing constructs such as emotional awareness and 
regulation.  Our findings provide preliminary evidence that body signal beliefs may prove to be a 
rich, hitherto unexplored research territory, for better assessing and understanding the nature of 
human emotion.  
Beyond the novelty of the present work, we also used the gold-standard methods for our 
constructs of interest. Several studies, for example, rely on self-report measures of interoception 
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(what we call interoceptive sensibility) but do not use more objective measures such as the 
modified Whitehead heartbeat detection task employed in this study. However, our study 
demonstrates that there is either no association (the BAQ) or a negative association (MAIA) 
between interoceptive sensibility and actual ability, suggesting a reinterpretation of prior studies 
only using the MAIA or BAQ as their proxy for interoception. Additionally, we used the Trier 
Social Stress Test as a robust induction of physiological and psychological stress and were 
careful to continuously capture participants’ sympathetic changes throughout the whole task. As 
such, we were able to model individual differences in sympathetic-specific reactivity with 
greater precision than a simple metric such as heart rate could provide.  
The present study is not without limitations. As this honors thesis is part of a larger 
ongoing study, it must be noted that these results may change when we reach the target number 
of 240 participants. Additionally, while we collected a continuous measure of sympathetic 
reactivity (i.e. pre-ejection period), this is only one index of sympathetic nervous system 
activation under stress. Future research into the interactions between sympathetic reactivity, 
interoceptive ability, and bodily signal beliefs should use multiple indices of sympathetic 
reactivity (e.g. cortisol, testosterone, pupillary dilation, etc.) in conjunction. 
Implications and Future Directions 
Beyond its implications for emotion and stress, the present study has several implications 
and future directions relevant to clinical and health outcomes. The novel body signal beliefs 
measure used in this study may be particularly illuminating in the case of clinical disorders 
where individuals’ perceptions of their bodily signals play a key role. For example, studies show 
diminished interoceptive ability in patients exhibiting dietary restraint (Merwin, Zucker, Lacy & 
Elliot, 2009; Pollatos et al., 2008;) and with obesity (Herbert & Pollatos, 2014). On the other 
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hand, interoceptive sensitivity is associated with intuitive eating, especially facets of intuitive 
eating related to awareness of hunger and satiety cues and the willingness to eat to satisfy hunger 
rather than to eat for external and emotional reasons (Herbert, Blechert, Hautzinger, Matthias, & 
Herbert, 2013). Given that disturbances in emotion regulation may also contribute to disordered 
eating behavior (e.g. Arnow et al., 1995; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Stice, 2001), 
individuals with eating disorders may display a negative attributional style towards processing 
internal bodily sensations that could amplify the experience of negative emotions. Thus, 
examining beliefs about bodily signals could be an important addition to understanding the 
etiology about eating disorders.  
Similarly, research indicates that individuals with anxiety disorders display enhanced 
anterior insular cortex processing (i.e. a brain region implicated in interoceptive processing) and 
hold disproportionately maladaptive views about their physiology (Paulus & Stein, 2010). For 
instance, one study found that children with high interoceptive ability had significantly higher 
self-reported panic and somatic symptoms as well as higher anxiety-sensitivity scores compared 
children with good and poor interoceptive ability (Ehley, Stirling, Ehlers, Gregory, & Clark, 
2004). These results suggest that the interaction between interoceptive ability and maladaptive 
beliefs about bodily signals may play a role in anxiety-related symptoms.  
Beyond mental health and psychopathology, beliefs about bodily signals in addition to 
interoceptive ability may be jointly important in the context of health behaviors and outcomes, 
such as pain management or illness prevention. For example, some new work demonstrates that 
individuals with exaggerated interoceptive perceptions appear more prone to addiction and 
consumption of stimulants (e.g., Stewart, May, Tapert, & Paulus, 2015). On the other hand, 
individuals who experience impoverished interoceptive ability might benefit from a moderate 
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increase in interoceptive awareness—for example, through contemplative practices such as 
mindfulness (e.g., de Jong et al., 2016). However, body signal beliefs may prove also fruitful in 
the context of health—for example, pain management could also include supportive 
conceptualizations and beliefs about the pain that help facilitate management, rather than 
catastrophizing it.  
Finally, the present paper focused on both negative and positive body signal beliefs. 
However, given the relatively stronger effects for positive body signal beliefs in buffering 
against negative affect, we also believe it is paramount for future research to further elucidate on 
the ways in which body signal beliefs might promote resilience in the face of psychological and 
physical adversity. This is a hopeful new direction, because the present study suggests that it’s 
not just the actual physiological signals that matter, nor even people’s awareness or access to 
those signals—but also the mindset or beliefs that people have which can help determine 
emotions and perhaps even wellbeing.  
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Figure 1. The interaction of greater negative body signal beliefs and reduced interoceptive ability in predicting negative affect.  
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Figure 2. The interaction of lower negative body signal beliefs and higher interoceptive ability in predicting somatic intensity.  
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Figure 3. The interaction of lower positive body signal beliefs and greater sympathetic reactivity in predicting negative affect. 
 
 
  
BODY SIGNAL BELIEFS 
 
  
53 
Table 1. Participant demographic information. This table contains data from 104 participants. 
 
Variable n (%) or Mean SD Range 
    Age 19.30 1.27 18.0 – 24.0 
    Gender    
           Female 53 (51.0%) - - 
           Male 51 (49.0%) - - 
    Race    
           American Indian/ Alaskan Native 2 (1.9%) - - 
           Asian American 16 (15.4%) - - 
           Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 0 - - 
           African American 14 (13.5%) - - 
           European American 42 (40.4%) - - 
           Latin American 7 (6.7%) - - 
           More than one race 7 (6.7%) - - 
           Other 16 (15.4%) - - 
Note: Responses to “Other” in Race included “Ashkenazi Jewish” (n =1), “White” (n =3), “Caucasian” (n = 6),  
“Asian” (n =2), “Indian” (n=1), “Persian” (n=1), “Native American/European/African American/Asian/Hawaiian” 
(n=1), and “white/many generations away from other races” (n=1). 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and ranges for key variables of interest.  
 
Measure N Mean SD Range Potential Range 
PEP 73 6.62 15.5 -48.0 – 87.3 - 
Negative body signal beliefs 104 2.72 0.87 1.17 – 4.83 1 – 7 
Positive body signal beliefs 104 4.31 1.19 2.00 – 7.00 1 – 7 
Interoceptive ability 66 -0.037 1.45 -.200 – 4.60 - 
Negative affect 83 0.74 1.43 -0.66 – 7.08 - 
      Emotional Intensity 83 2.48 0.60 1.33 – 3.77 0 – 6 
      Affective Appraisals 83 2.32 0.99 1.00 – 5.27 0 – 6 
Somatic intensity 83 1.80 0.56 1.00 – 3.40 0 – 6 
Task Stress 83 3.35 0,91 1.00– 5.50 0 – 6 
BAQ 104 4.09 0.86 2.39 – 6.00 1 – 7 
MAIA 104 2.73 0.53 1.13 – 4.19 1 – 6 
Emotion regulation self-efficacy 104 72.6 14.4 27.50 – 98.75 0% – 100% 
Emotional clarity 104 4.82 0.79 1.50 – 3.80 1 – 5 
Alexithymia 104 2.53 0.47 1.50 – 3.80 1 – 5 
Somatization 104 1.51 0.49 1.00 – 3.74 1 – 5 
Note: For physiological reactivity measurement, PEP is pre-ejection period; For interoceptive ability measurement, HBD is heartbeat detection 
task d-prime score. For TSST self-report measures, Negative affect is the mean score of negative emotions (as measured by the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule) and negative appraisal (as measured by the Affective Appraisals Questionnaire); emotional intensity is the mean score 
from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, somatic intensity is the mean score from the Somatic Sensations Questionnaire, and Task Stress is 
the mean score from the Task Rating manipulation check. BAQ is Body Awareness Questionnaire; MAIA is Multidimensional Assessment of 
Interoceptive Awareness; Emotional clarity is Trait Emotional Clarity; Alexithymia is the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20; Somatization is the 
mean somatization score from two subscales on Common Mental Disorders – Screening Questionnaire.  
BODY SIGNAL BELIEFS 
 
  
55 
Table 3. Inter-correlations between the 12 items on the Body Signal Beliefs questions. (N=104) 
 
 Negative Beliefs Positive Beliefs Excluded Beliefs 
Items 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Negative Beliefs            
1. My body is unpredictable .35** .37** .21* .38** .31** .27** -.08 .11 -.07 .02 -.02 
2. I have a hard time handling by bodily 
sensations - .28** .19† .47** .36** .18† -.20* .06 .07 -.05 .02 
3. I believe that my body’s feelings can be 
misleading  - .29** .39** .29** .25** -.18† .02 -.05 -.01 .14 
4. Listening to my sensations can be 
problematic   - .28** .24* .18† -.04 .23* .02 .25** .05 
5. My bodily urges are difficult to control    - .22* .37** -.07 .01 .01 .10 .08 
6. Sometimes I’m afraid of my bodily 
feelings     - .30** -.07 .12 .01 .12 -.03 
Positive Beliefs            
7. My body is an intense place      - .30** .49** .19* .10 .08 
8. I enjoy taking care of my body       - .39** .21* .23* .13 
9. I believe my body is a source of wisdom        - .38** .19* .10 
Excluded Beliefs            
10. I believe it is important to indulge my 
body completely         - .09 .40** 
11. I believe it is important to control my 
bodily urges completely          - .11 
12. I like to indulge my senses           - 
Note: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10   
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Table 4. Pattern matrix (N =104) 
 
Item 1 2 3 4 
I have a hard time handling by bodily sensations 0.66 -.141 0.16 -0.053 
My bodily urges are difficult to control  0.65 0.080 0.023 -0.011 
I believe that my body’s feelings can be misleading 0.59 -0.01 -0.015 0.018 
My body is unpredictable 0.56 0.032 -0.063 0.062 
Sometimes I’m afraid of my bodily feelings 0.47 0.096 -0.058 0.11 
Listening to my sensations can be problematic 0.43 -0.047 0.01 0.43 
My body is an intense place 0.22 0.97 -0.06 -0.18 
I enjoy taking care of my body -0.024 0.47 0.18 0.25 
I believe my body is a source of wisdom -0.34 0.45 0.01 0.24 
I believe it is important to indulge my body completely -0.028 0.044 1.00 -0.053 
I like to indulge my senses  0.064 0.018 0.40 0.039 
I believe it is important to control my bodily urges completely  0.046 0.036 -0.018 0.53 
Note: Factor 1 taps into negative beliefs about bodily signals. Factor 2 taps into positive beliefs about bodily signals. Factor 3 may be about beliefs 
in hedonistic indulgence of bodily sensations. Factor 4 may be about suppression of bodily signals.  
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Table 5. Model 1A: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported negative affect during the Trier Social Stress Task, with main 
effects and interactions for pre-ejection period, negative body signal beliefs, and interoceptive ability.  
 
Predictor variables R2 B SE (b) b P 
Step 1 .34**    .001 
    PEP  .55** .194 .40 .006 
    Neg Beliefs  .37* .183 .22 .050 
    PEP x Neg Beliefs  .44 .276 .22 .116 
Step 2 .39    .416 
     PEP  .43 .358 .31 .231 
     Neg Beliefs  .32 .215 .192 .140 
     HBD  -.08 .194 -.06 .679 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs  .21 .464 .11 .654 
     HBD x Neg Beliefs   -.27 .189 -.20 .163 
     HBD x PEP  -.28 .369 -.16 .459 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs x HBD  -.22 .370 -.12 .563 
Step 3 .43†    .062 
     PEP  .44 .349 .32 .210 
     Neg Beliefs  .28 .211 .17 .190 
     HBD  -.03 .191 -.02 .861 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs  .05 .460 .02 .919 
     HBD x Neg Beliefs   -.34† .187 -.25 .079 
     HBD x PEP  -.39 .364 -.22 .295 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs x HBD  -.20 .361 -.11 .584 
     Gender  -.63† .332 -.22 .062 
Note: All main effects are z-scored. As an index of sympathetic reactivity, PEP is pre-ejection period. Neg or Pos Beliefs are the mean scores of 
either negative or positive body signal beliefs. For interoceptive ability, HBD is the sensitivity index or d’ of the heartbeat detection task score. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 6. Model 1B: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported somatic intensity during the Trier Social Stress Task, with main 
effects and interactions for pre-ejection period, negative body signal beliefs, and interoceptive ability. 
 
Predictor variables R2 B SE (b) b p 
Step 1 .12†    .074 
    PEP  .13 .090 .24 .152 
    Neg Beliefs  .14 .084 .21 .106 
    PEP x Neg Beliefs  .06 .127 .08 .623 
Step 2 .20    .284 
     PEP  .36* .163 .65 .032 
     Neg Beliefs  .06 .098 .08 .578 
     HBD  .08 .089 .13 .392 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs  -.29 .212 -.37 .179 
     HBD x Neg Beliefs   -.17* .086 -.32 .048 
     HBD x PEP  .20 .168 .29 .236 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs x HBD  -.27 .169 -.37 .111 
Step 3 .23    .167 
     PEP  .36* .162 .66 .029 
     Neg Beliefs  .04 .098 .06 .678 
     HBD  .09 .089 .16 .301 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs  -.34 .214 -.44 .114 
     HBD x Neg Beliefs   -.20* .087 -.38 .027 
     HBD x PEP  .16 .169 .24 .335 
     PEP x Neg Beliefs x HBD  -.27 .167 -.37 .116 
     Gender  -.22 .154 -.186 .167 
Note: All main effects are z-scored. As an index of sympathetic reactivity, PEP is pre-ejection period. Neg or Pos Beliefs are the mean scores of 
either negative or positive body signal beliefs. For interoceptive ability, HBD is the sensitivity index or d’ of the heartbeat detection task score. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 7. Model 2A: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported negative affect during the Trier Social Stress Task, with main 
effects and interactions for pre-ejection period, positive body signal beliefs, and interoceptive ability.  
 
Predictor variables R2 B SE (b) b p 
Step 1 .43**    .001 
    PEP  .77** .142 .55 .001 
    Pos Beliefs  -.09 .134 -.07 .524 
    PEP x Pos Beliefs  -.78** .194 -.42 .001 
Step 2 .37    .791 
     PEP  .89** .246 .64 .001 
     Pos Beliefs  -.04 .144 -.04 .762 
     HBD  .19 .187 .13 .311 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs  -.67* .261 -.36 .013 
     HBD x Pos Beliefs   .06 .175 .04 .747 
     HBD x PEP  .23 .324 .13 .490 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs x HBD  .36 .344 .17 .300 
Step 3 .38    .197 
     PEP  .83** .249 .60 .002 
     Pos Beliefs  -.04 .143 -.04 .758 
     HBD  .17 .186 .12 .362 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs  -.63* .262 -.34 .021 
     HBD x Pos Beliefs   .07 .174 .05 .704 
     HBD x PEP  .13 .331 .04 .698 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs x HBD  .33 .342 .15 .341 
     Gender  -.41 .313 -.14 .197 
Note: All main effects are z-scored. As an index of sympathetic reactivity, PEP is pre-ejection period. Neg or Pos Beliefs are the mean scores of 
either negative or positive body signal beliefs. For interoceptive ability, HBD is the sensitivity index or d’ of the heartbeat detection task score. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 8. Model 2B: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported negative affect during the Trier Social Stress Task, with main 
effects and interactions for pre-ejection period, positive body signal beliefs, and interoceptive ability. 
 
Predictor variables R2 B SE (b) b P 
Step 1 .07    .248 
    PEP  .15* .072 .27 .045 
    Pos Beliefs  .01 .068 .02 .884 
    PEP x Pos Beliefs  -.02 .099 -.03 .818 
Step 2 .16    .277 
     PEP  .16 .121 .29 .194 
     Pos Beliefs  .03 .071 .06 .649 
     HBD  .07 .092 .13 .427 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs  .01 .129 .01 .977 
     HBD x Pos Beliefs   -.13 .086 -.23 .148 
     HBD x PEP  .00 .160 .00 .999 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs x HBD  .10 .169 .11 .569 
Step 3 .17    .367 
     PEP  .14 .124 .25 .274 
     Pos Beliefs  .03 .071 .06 .651 
     HBD  .07 .093 .11 .473 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs  .02 .130 .03 .873 
     HBD x Pos Beliefs   -.12 .087 -.23 .160 
     HBD x PEP  -.03 .164 -.05 .840 
     PEP x Pos Beliefs x HBD  .09 .170 .10 .613 
     Gender  -.14 .156 -.12 .367 
Note: All main effects are z-scored. As an index of sympathetic reactivity, PEP is pre-ejection period. Neg or Pos Beliefs are the mean scores of 
either negative or positive body signal beliefs. For interoceptive ability, HBD is the sensitivity index or d’ of the heartbeat detection task score. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 9. Exploratory analysis: Bivariate correlations between variables of interest. (N=83) 
 
 Beliefs HBD TSST Emotion trait Gender 
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Sympathetic reactivity       .       
1. PEP -.083 -.069 -.18 .36** .20† -.01 -.15 -.062 .029 -.029 .028 .067 .010 
Body signal beliefs              
2. Negative - .20* .35** .13 .17 .016 .14 -.11 -.027 -.28** .32** .34** .093 
3. Positive  - -.079 -.030 .035 -.23* .53** .59** .14 .12 -.11 .25* .17† 
Interoception              
4. HBD   - -.11 -.032 .069 -.041 -.29* -.27* -.14 .18 .17 .026 
TSST self-report              
5. Neg affect    - .38** .24* -.091 .025 .029 -.075 .13 .11 -.17 
6. Somatic intensity     - .57** -.078 -.10 -.20† -.078 .099 .25* -.11 
7. Task Stress      - -.22* -.18 -.27* -.083 .14 -.12 -.17 
Trait measures               
8. BAQ       - .50** .17† .14 -.041 .25* .084 
9. MAIA        - .14 .31** -.31** .17† .090 
10. Reg efficacy         - .25* -.062 .093 .21* 
11. Emo clarity          - -.69** -.019 .096 
12. Alexithymia           - .10 -.074 
13. Somatization            - .00 
Demographics              
14. Gender             - 
Note: For physiological reactivity measurement, PEP is pre-ejection period; for body signal beliefs, negative vs. positive beliefs are mean scores. 
For interoceptive ability measurement, HBD is heartbeat detection task d’ score. For TSST self-report measures, Neg affect is mean negative 
appraisal plus mean negative emotion score and Task Stress is the mean score from the Task Rating measure; BAQ is Body Awareness 
Questionnaire; MAIA is Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness; Reg efficacy is Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy; Emo 
clarity is Trait Emotional Clarity; Alexithymia is the TAS-20; Somatization is the mean somatization score from two subscales in Common Mental 
Disorders – Screening Questionnaire.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
 
